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Article
Ecological 
Responsiveness and 
Corporate Real Estate
Piet M. A. Eichholtz1, Nils Kok1,  
and John M. Quigley2
Abstract
Firms’ real estate choices significantly affect their sustainability, due to 
real estate’s impact on the natural environment. This paper investigates 
the ecological responsiveness of firms in specific industries by analyzing 
the decisions these firms make in occupying office space. We analyze the 
decisions of more than 11,000 tenants to choose office space in green 
buildings or in, otherwise comparable, conventional buildings nearby. 
Controlling for building quality and location, we find that corporations in 
the oil and banking industries, as well as non-profit organizations, are among 
the most prominent green tenants. Furthermore, measures of an industry’s 
human capital intensity are positively related to the propensity to lease green 
office space. These empirical findings confirm the theoretical framework on 
economic advantage and institutional pressure as important determinants 
for the ecological responsiveness of firms.
Keywords
sustainability, green real estate, corporate tenants
There is an increasing societal interest in the sustainability of the built envi-
ronment, motivated by the recognition that buildings and their associated 
construction activity have a significant environmental impact. Indeed, the 
1Maastricht University, The Netherlands
2University of California, Berkeley, USA
Corresponding Author:
Piet M. A. Eichholtz, Professor of Finance and Real Estate, School of Business and Economics, 
Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200MD Maastricht, The Netherlands. 
Email: p.eichholtz@maastrichtuniversity.nl
575118 BASXXX10.1177/0007650315575118Business & SocietyEichholtz et al.
research-article2015
2 Business & Society 
demand for more efficient, “green” real estate—real estate characterized by 
exemplary environmental performance—is on the rise throughout the 
developed world. Examples range from a “green campus” built by Chevron 
in Louisiana to the energy-efficient headquarters of Deutsche Bank in 
Frankfurt am Main, Germany. In addition, although commercial real estate 
markets in many countries have endured major contractions in recent years, 
the number of green buildings is rapidly increasing (Kok, McGraw, & 
Quigley, 2011).
The increasing importance of more efficient buildings may have several 
implications for financial intermediaries. First, from the perspective of the 
company, integrating sustainability in the management of real property can 
be important for firms seeking to adopt more ecologically responsive busi-
ness practices, for example through cost reductions, as energy costs amount 
to nearly 10% of total housing cost. The strategic choices that firms make in 
the sustainability of their real estate may thus affect the performance of these 
firms, as well as the performance of their de facto real estate providers—their 
landlords. Indeed, firms’ landlords, or asset owners, are the second group that 
may be affected by the choice for sustainable real estate. For real estate 
investment trusts (REITs), which are among the main providers of corporate 
space, there is empirical evidence that the financial markets take account of 
the sustainability of the portfolio: REITs’ ownership of sustainable assets is 
related to a better credit rating and lower cost of debt (Eichholtz, Kok, & 
Yonder, 2013). Third, the (equity) capital providers of these institutional 
landlords increasingly demand sustainable business practices or “socially 
responsible investments” (SRI).1 For example, more than 60 of the world’s 
premier institutional investors are screening the sustainability performance of 
REITs through the Global Real Estate Sustainability Benchmark (GRESB), 
which measures the sustainability of these landlords.
To explore the implications of green building on financial intermediaries 
in more detail, this article investigates corporate choices with respect to sus-
tainability in the real estate sector. There is a significant body of research on 
the ecological responsiveness of firms, following the seminal work by Bansal 
and Roth (2000). An important example is Ramus and Montiel (2005), who 
study the determinants of corporate environmental commitment. Other 
examples are Aragón-Correa and Rubio-López (2007), who study environ-
mental commitment in the food industry, and Linnenluecke and Griffiths 
(2010) who look at the effect of corporate culture on sustainability. Recent 
literature on real estate and sustainability has studied the economic implica-
tions of green office buildings in the United States, documenting that green 
buildings command premium rental rates and sales prices (Eichholtz, Kok, & 
Quigley, 2010).
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This article builds on the Ramus and Montiel (2005) framework, and it 
extends their analysis in four ways. First, Ramus and Montiel (2005) study 
just 10 firms to establish industry differences in environmental policy imple-
mentation. The present authors are able to employ a sample of more than 
3,100 tenants in 1,180 green office buildings and a control sample of approxi-
mately 8,000 tenants in 4,000 conventional office buildings, allowing for 
stronger statistical inferences at the industry level. Second, Ramus and 
Montiel (2005) had to exclude certain industries from their analysis, due to 
lack of data, analyzing variation in ecological responsiveness in four indus-
tries. We do not face a similar problem, and are able to analyze 10 different 
industries. Third, Ramus and Montiel (2005) investigate the implementation 
of environmental decisions only for firms that had already committed to an 
environmental policy, whereas we are able to study a more diverse set of 
firms, likely having more heterogeneity in the stance regarding sustainable 
development. Last, Ramus and Montiel (2005) exploit a survey to assess 
environmental policy implementation, whereas our proxy allows us to 
observe corporate actions directly, through these corporations’ decisions 
regarding the use of green versus conventional office space.
The article first develops hypotheses about the types of industries that are 
more likely to choose green space rather than conventional space. The authors 
then investigate these hypotheses, using hand-collected data on the identity 
and industry characteristics of tenants in green buildings in the United States. 
We adopt a working definition of green office buildings, as those certified by 
either the Energy Star or the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design 
(LEED) program.2 We also construct a control sample of other, conventional 
office buildings, closely matched on geographical characteristics.
The descriptive statistics reveal that firms in the oil industry and in the 
financial services industry tend to be the largest occupiers of green office 
buildings. The empirical analysis shows that companies in the mining and 
construction industry, as well as the government and government-related 
organizations, are systematically more likely to lease green office space 
rather than conventional space, compared with corporate tenants in other 
industries. Furthermore, employee skill intensity and compensation are posi-
tively related to corporate use of green office space. This positive relationship 
confirms hypotheses about the determinants of corporate ecological 
responsiveness.
Our findings provide important information for financial intermediaries. 
From the perspective of the company, this study shows that corporate leasing 
decisions can facilitate the implementation of an ecologically responsible 
strategy, and that real estate can be a tangible element of the ecological 
responsiveness of firms in specific industries. Interestingly, firms within the 
4 Business & Society 
financial services industry turn out to be among the most intensive users of 
green office space. For the providers of space—often REITs—the effect of a 
demand-pull for more green real estate also has implications for their portfo-
lio strategy, and for their ability to raise capital and the cost of that capital: 
REITs with more sustainable assets have better credit ratings and pay lower 
interest rates on their debt (Eichholtz, Kok, & Yonder, 2013). From the per-
spective of institutional investors, which increasingly hold their real estate 
exposure through stakes in REITs, the sustainability of real estate assets is 
relevant for the performance of the real estate companies and funds they own 
(Eichholtz, Kok, & Yonder, 2012). Besides that, the sustainability of their 
real estate holdings may also reflect the environmental stance of institutional 
investors.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The section 
“Ecological Responsiveness and Real Estate” summarizes previous work on 
the ecological responsiveness of private firms, and we develop hypotheses 
predicting the likelihood that firms in different industries will choose to “rent 
green.” The section “Data and Analysis” provides an overview of the data, 
the methods, and some descriptive statistics. The “Results” section presents 
results of the statistical analysis. The “Discussion” section provides a discus-
sion and conclusions.
Ecological Responsiveness and Real Estate
Traditional models in the environmental literature identify four main deter-
minants of corporate ecological performance: economic opportunities, stake-
holder pressure, legislation, and ethical motives (Bansal & Roth, 2000). 
Assuming that companies within the same industry are exposed to similar 
types of legislation and economic incentives, these determinants can be gen-
eralized to the industry level. For example, companies in the financial ser-
vices industry compete for human capital in the same labor market, and may 
thus adopt similar policies and strategies to attract employees.
Empirically, Ramus and Montiel (2005) analyze the commitment to spe-
cific environmental policies, and the implementation of those policies, 
across four industry sectors. They show that firms from different industries 
follow similar patterns in their commitment to a set of environmental poli-
cies, but there are significant industry differences in the implementation of 
those policies. In the same spirit, we further advance the argument that 
companies in different industries will vary in their implementation of envi-
ronmental policies. We develop four testable hypotheses, using corporate 
leasing decisions as a proxy for the actual environmental commitment of an 
industry.
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Economic Advantage From Ecological Responsiveness
Economic advantage as a motivation for ecological responsiveness is closely 
related to the financial performance of the firm. Active implementation of an 
environmental policy—beyond just complying with environmental regula-
tion—is costly. Konar and Cohen (2001) estimate that U.S. firms invest a 
combined amount of some 1.5% to 2% of GDP annually on environmental 
policies, and these expenditures may crowd out other productive investments 
(Palmer, Oates, & Portney, 1995). Nevertheless, there appears to be a positive 
association between corporate environmental performance and corporate 
financial performance (Karpoff, Lott, & Rankine, 1999; Klassen & 
McLaughlin, 1996; Konar & Cohen, 2001).
The positive effect of environmental policies on financial performance 
may materialize following cost reductions by lowering input and waste dis-
posal costs (Porter & Van der Linde, 1995). Green buildings can play an 
important role in this regard, as the operating costs of such buildings may be 
substantially lower, even if their rents are generally higher. For commercial 
buildings, energy—an important element of sustainability—represents a sig-
nificant expense in the operation of buildings, with energy costs at nearly 
10% of total housing costs, on average. Anecdotal evidence shows that 
LEED-certified buildings, on average, use 30% less energy than conventional 
buildings (Kats, 2003), and it is claimed that the energy savings on buildings 
with an Energy Star label are almost 40%. Thus, using green buildings may 
have a direct impact on total housing costs.
Cost reductions from the implementation of environmental policies typi-
cally most affect resource-intensive industries in the primary and secondary 
sectors, as documented by Ramus and Montiel (2005). However, cost savings 
from leasing more efficient buildings are most significant for firms active in 
sectors that tend to have office-space-intensive operations, which is more 
likely for firms in the tertiary industry (the service sector). Firms operating in 
the service sector thus may also be more likely to rent green space than firms 
in other sectors.
Another, more indirect, benefit that may follow from the occupancy of a 
green building is an increase in employee productivity. Several studies have 
reported a positive correlation between a building’s internal environment 
(such as its indoor air quality) and employee health and productivity. (Danna 
& Griffin, 1999, review the literature on health and well-being in the work-
place; see also Hoffman, Wood, & Kreiss, 1993). The potential gains of 
reduced sick leave and increased productivity are substantial, and given that 
staff costs represent a major share of total expenditures for the average firm, 
the potential financial benefits from improved productivity are substantial 
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(Edwards, 2006; Nelson, 2007). A recent paper by Edmans (2011) shows that 
corporate financial performance is positively related to employee satisfac-
tion, which is not only affected by pecuniary benefits but also by the quality 
of working conditions.
And even if green real estate did not make a firm’s existing work force 
more productive, it could attract a more productive workforce. This attrac-
tiveness may arise from an improved corporate reputation deriving from a 
commitment to green values. Corporate reputation has been documented to 
be an important determinant of job choice (Gatewood, Gowan, & 
Lautenschlager, 1993), and therefore in acquiring human capital. Indeed, T. 
N. Bauer and Aiman-Smith (1996) show that firms having a positive attitude 
toward the natural environment are regarded as more attractive employers 
than otherwise comparable firms without such an attitude. As human capital 
is viewed as a key source of value creation in modern firms (Zingales, 2000), 
the attraction and retention of employees is especially important in econo-
mies and industries where skilled employees are scarce and skills are inelasti-
cally supplied. Henriques and Sadorsky (1999) show that the perceived 
importance of organizational stakeholders (e.g., the workforce) plays a large 
role in determining the managerial attitude toward the environment.
Thus, a positive stance toward the natural environment can increase suc-
cess in hiring and retaining high-quality human capital. The degree to which 
human capital is important for firms is affected by the industry the firm oper-
ates in, and we argue that human capital is likely to be most salient for orga-
nizations in the service industry. For example, the enhanced indoor air quality 
arising from an improved building structure, and from better heating, cool-
ing, and ventilation systems, is most beneficial for firms largely dependent on 
highly trained workers, such as firms in the financial industry or in profes-
sional services. This relationship results in the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Industries that are dependent on high levels of human capi-
tal, such as the service sector, will be more likely to rent office space in 
green buildings.
Hypothesis 2: Space-intensive industries, such as the service sector, will 
be more likely to rent office space in green buildings.
Institutional Pressure and Ecological Responsiveness: Legitimacy 
and Financial Market Reputation
Institutional pressure as a determinant of ecological responsiveness is 
strongly related to reputation and credibility with a firm’s stakeholders. The 
use of green space may signal that a firm has a long-run commitment to the 
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environment. So the occupancy of green buildings may translate into an 
improved reputation, which is important for investors. Investors are powerful 
corporate stakeholders (Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, 1997), and the investment 
community has embraced the concept of SRI with enthusiasm. SRI assets 
under management increased from $639 billion in 1995 to $2.71 trillion in 
2007 (Social Investment Forum [SIF], 2007). Investors such as APG in the 
Netherlands, Hermes in the United Kingdom, and TIAA-CREF in the United 
States have implemented SRI strategies, which are consistently communi-
cated to their stakeholders.3
Barnea, Heinkel, and Kraus (2005) report that investors following a SRI 
approach can induce polluting firms to reform, and Henriques and Sadorsky 
(1996) find that the environmental policies of firms are responsive to share-
holder pressure. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also increasingly 
use a SRI approach—by investing in SRI mutual funds—to influence firms 
to adopt corporate social responsibility (CSR) and specific environmental 
policies (Guay, Doh, & Sinclair, 2004).
SRI strategies typically imply that investors avoid corporations that cause 
social injury or environmental damage (Spicer, 1978). This “negative screen-
ing” may lead institutional investors to be systematically underinvested in 
so-called “sin” stocks (Hong & Kacperczyk, 2009). It is likely that corpora-
tions with environmentally sensitive operations are exposed more directly to 
the risk of exclusion, providing a strong incentive for the adoption and imple-
mentation of an environmentally responsive strategy.
If leasing green office space leads to a superior corporate reputation, this 
may enable firms to attract investors more easily and at better market rates 
(Milgrom & Roberts, 1986). Some empirical studies show that companies 
with highly developed environmental engagement are able to obtain better 
credit ratings, thereby lowering the cost of debt (Bassen, Hölz, & Schlange, 
2006). Derwall and Verwijmeren (2007) show that these firms tend to have a 
lower cost of equity.
Bansal and Clelland (2004) find that firms with low environmental legiti-
macy can reduce the associated negative stock performance effects by 
expressing an active commitment to the natural environment. Leasing green 
real estate may be a straightforward way to express that commitment, signal-
ing the superior social responsibility of the tenants who locate there. Thus, 
ecological responsiveness in corporate leasing decisions could potentially 
help in offsetting a negative corporate image or in improving the reputation 
of firms in objectionable industries.
The likelihood of becoming a target of environmental litigation and public 
scrutiny depends on the industry type. For example, firms in environmentally 
sensitive industries are more exposed to media visibility, which shapes the 
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public’s view of firm activities (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). Henriques and 
Sadorsky (1999) find that the firms engaging most actively in environmental 
activities tend to place special importance on environmental industry groups.
Thus, the discipline of financial markets may cause firms to implement 
active CSR policies. Especially for firms with environmentally sensitive 
operations, the risk of negative screening by investors is likely to be impor-
tant, and through attention from the media and NGOs, these firms are also 
more exposed to public scrutiny from consumers. Firms differ in the environ-
mental sensitivity of their operations especially across industries, although 
these differences are likely to be less apparent within an industry. This varia-
tion leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Industries characterized by environmentally sensitive oper-
ations will be more likely to lease green office space.
Environmental Responsibility
Although the attention of investors is focused understandably on firm profits, 
there is a distinct group of organizations for which the non-financial utility 
from pursuing an active environmental policy exceeds the potential monetary 
costs of such a policy. The concept of environmental ideology (Kahn, 2007) 
suggests that non-profit organizations and government agencies may be more 
active in environmental engagement than purely profit-maximizing firms. As 
Energy-Star-labeled office buildings are known to emit far less carbon than 
conventional buildings (Eichholtz, Kok, & Quigley, 2013), leasing green 
buildings may be a logical step for these organizations, even if the rents are 
higher.
Furthermore, first-movers and early-adopters of environmental innova-
tions are often those parties for whom monetary gains are of secondary 
importance, and the public sector is relatively eager to demonstrate its envi-
ronmental engagement through leasing space in green buildings, because it is 
“the right thing to do” (Wood, 1991).
Finally, for a public sector trying to “nudge” society toward reduced 
energy consumption and lower carbon emissions, leading by example is an 
alternative to regulation. As such a policy does not put a direct—financial—
burden on certain groups of consumers or manufacturers, it may be more 
palatable politically than implementing regulation. These considerations lead 
to the fourth hypothesis, again formulated at the industry level:
Hypothesis 4: The public sector and other non-profit institutions will be 
more likely to lease green space.
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In assessing the determinants of ecological responsiveness, we follow an 
industry-level approach, as industry differences have been documented to play a 
crucial role in ecological responsiveness. Field cohesion, “the intensity and den-
sity of formal and informal network ties in an organizational field” (Bansal & 
Roth, 2000, p. 730), is an important determinant of a firm’s environmental per-
formance. Field cohesion is likely to be strong within industries and less strong 
across industries (Ramus & Montiel, 2005). It would therefore be difficult to find 
meaningful results in a broad firm-level analysis of ecological responsiveness; 
the firm-level effects would be dominated by the industry influences.
This choice arises also from our interest in industry-level differences in 
the motivations of firms to opt for commercial space in green buildings. In 
addition, we have access to a large number of observations across different 
industries, but we lack firm- or establishment-level data. Moreover, we 
observe publicly listed, privately traded, and non-profit tenants, as well as the 
government and government-related entities. Systematic corporate informa-
tion (such as financial metrics) is available only for the former, which inhibits 
a comprehensive firm-level analysis.
We investigate how the motivations to rent green office space differ across 
industries. Some industries will have a higher likelihood of leasing green 
office space than others: the economic advantage hypothesis is related to oper-
ational costs and human capital considerations, and therefore likely to play an 
important role in the service sector. The first institutional pressure hypothesis 
is linked to corporate reputation, and therefore likely to be more salient in 
environmentally sensitive industries, such as mining and oil. The motive of 
environmental responsibility (the second institutional pressure hypothesis) is 
probably most prevalent for governmental and non-profit organizations.
Data and Analysis
To empirically test the four hypotheses, the authors collected information on 
tenants in commercial office buildings that have received an Energy Star or 
LEED certification. These labels represent the most widely used certifica-
tions of green buildings in the United States.
Energy Star was established in 1992 as a voluntary labeling program 
designed to classify and promote energy-efficient products. The Energy Star 
label for commercial buildings was adopted in 1995. The label has been pro-
moted as an efficient way to identify energy-efficient buildings and is mar-
keted as an indication of better environmental protection, but it focuses solely 
on energy consumption and does not measure other green characteristics.
Commercial properties can receive an Energy Star certification if the 
source energy use of the building, as certified by a professional engineer, 
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achieves certain specified benchmark levels. The benchmark is chosen such 
that the label is awarded to the top quarter of all comparable buildings ranked 
in terms of source energy efficiency.
The LEED rating system has been developed to encourage the “adoption of 
sustainable green building and development practices.” LEED uses a broad 
definition of building sustainability and is based on a wide range of criteria. 
The requirements for certification of LEED buildings include such factors as 
“site selection,” “brownfield redevelopment,” and the availability of “bicycle 
storage and changing rooms,” as well as energy performance. An external con-
sultant evaluates a building on criteria in six categories to establish the LEED 
rating.4 It is claimed that LEED-certified buildings have lower operating costs 
and provide healthier and safer environments for occupants. It is also noted 
that the award of a LEED designation “demonstrate[s] an owner’s commit-
ment to environmental stewardship and social responsibility.”
The addresses and postal codes of the Energy Star and LEED buildings are 
publicly available. We match these addresses to office buildings listed in the 
CoStar database. CoStar is a repository and provider of U.S. commercial real 
estate financial data. The CoStar database includes current rental and occu-
pancy information as well as quality characteristics of buildings. We matched 
the CoStar database with the Energy Star and LEED address files as of June 
2008. We found 1,360 green labeled office buildings: 1,045 buildings with an 
Energy Star label, 286 buildings with a LEED label, and 29 buildings with a 
dual certification.
Control Sample
Even if corporations base their housing decisions on the environmental char-
acteristics of office buildings, these are not likely to be their paramount con-
siderations. Corporations will also evaluate the quality of the building and the 
location of the premises. We therefore match each green building to a set of 
commercial office buildings that are in close proximity. In this way, we iden-
tify clusters of nearby buildings. Each cluster contains one green office build-
ing and all other office buildings within a quarter mile radius. This match 
yields 1,180 clusters, each containing one green building and an average of 
three nearby control buildings.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 provides more detailed information on the sample of green build-
ings, and on the control sample of conventional office buildings. (Variable 
definitions are in the Appendix Table A1). The table shows that the green 
buildings differ substantially on some key quality issues. For example, the 
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green buildings are substantially larger, on average, than the nearby control 
buildings. They are also slightly taller, by about two stories. The age differ-
ence between green buildings and conventional buildings is large: Green 
buildings average about 24 years in age, whereas buildings in the control 
sample are twice as old, on average. Because they are older, the control 
buildings are much more likely to have been renovated than are the green 
buildings.
The overall quality of the green buildings is substantially higher. Seventy-
nine percent are rated as “class A,” whereas only 35% of the control buildings 
have that rating. Only about 1% of the green buildings are rated as “class C,” 
whereas more than 16% of the control buildings have this rating. A larger 
fraction of green buildings have on-site amenities such as retail shops, mail 
rooms, and exercise facilities.
The green buildings have slightly higher occupancy rates, and the vari-
ability in occupancy is lower for green buildings than for the control build-
ings. Green buildings are also more likely to have a net rent contract, in which 
the tenants pay directly for utilities.
Table 1 illustrates the importance of controlling for building quality. 
Corporate housing decisions are likely to be made on the basis of many of the 
quality characteristics presented above, and the greenness of the building is 
just one of these. For example, building age is an important determinant of 
corporate housing decisions, and given the strong relation between age and 
greenness, not controlling for age could lead to inaccurate inferences.
Analysis
For each green building in the sample, we recorded the names of the five larg-
est tenants, their Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes, and the floor 
space they occupied. We were also able to determine the total volume of green 
office space occupied by each individual firm. Similarly, we collected data on 
the total square footage of green office space that was occupied in each spe-
cific four-digit SIC code.5 This matching and data extraction yields a sample 
of 1,180 green office buildings, occupied by 3,179 different tenants. We also 
collected the same information on the buildings in the control sample, which 
includes 4,390 office buildings, with approximately 8,000 unique tenants.
Results
Green Space Consumption by Firms and Industries
Table 2 provides an overview of the green space occupied by the 20 largest 
tenants in the United States. Column (1) shows the green space occupied by 
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each tenant. Commercial banks, such as Wells Fargo Bank and Bank of 
America, are among the main green space users. These are human capital 
intensive financial service firms, lending support to Hypothesis 1. But this 
high ranking for the financial sector is partially explained by its extensive use 
of office space in general—the financial services industry is notoriously 
space intensive—which is in line with Hypothesis 2.
The oil industry seems to be well represented in green office buildings 
also, with tenants such as Shell and Chevron leasing a substantial percentage 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (Standard Deviations in Parentheses).
Green buildings Control buildings
Sample size 1,180 4,390
Building size (thousands sq. ft.) 324.08 (288.92) 218.69 (293.67)
Stories (number) 15.31 (13.26) 13.07 (12.11)
Stories (%)
 Low (<10) 46.25 (49.90) 53.49 (49.88)
 Medium (10-20) 26.66 (44.25) 25.25 (43.45)
 High (>20) 27.08 (44.47) 21.27 (40.93)
Age (years) 23.85 (15.57) 49.45 (32.50)
Age (%)
 Less than 10 years 14.27 (35.00) 4.87 (21.53)
 10 to 20 years 24.06 (42.78) 9.40 (29.19)
 21 to 30 years 43.37 (49.59) 25.13 (43.38)
 31 to 40 years 11.10 (31.43) 13.25 (33.90)
 More than 40 years 7.20 (25.88) 47.34 (49.93)
Building classa (%)
 A 79.39 (40.48) 34.94 (47.68)
 B 19.45 (39.61) 48.78 (49.99)
 C 1.15 (10.68) 16.28 (36.92)
On-site amenitiesb (%) 71.76 (45.05) 49.22 (50.00)
Renovated buildings (%) 21.04 (40.79) 38.51 (48.67)
Asking rent (dollars/sq. ft.) 29.84 (12.98) 28.14 (15.60)
Net rent contractc (%) 5.76 (23.32) 3.15 (17.47)
Occupancy rate (%) 89.12 (12.76) 81.35 (22.73)
Note. The control sample consists of all commercial office buildings within a 0.25 mile radius 
of each rated building for which comparable data are available.
aBuilding Classes A, B, and C are nationally standardized quality ratings of commercial 
property. Class A is best.
bOne or more of the following amenities are available on-site: banking, convenience store, 
dry cleaner, exercise facilities, food court, food service, mail room, restaurant, retail shops, 
vending areas, fitness center.
cNet rent contracts require tenants to pay separately for utilities.
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of the green building office stock. This industry presence is in line with the 
institutional pressure hypothesis (Hypothesis 3), where we posit that firms 
with environmentally sensitive operations are more inclined to lease space in 
green buildings. Furthermore, in support of Hypothesis 4, the U.S. Federal 
Government and government-related organizations, such as the Department 
of Health and Human Sciences and the Environmental Protection Agency, are 
prominent tenants of green office space.
To account for differences in office space utilization among industries, 
column (4) shows the total volume of office space occupied by the largest 
green tenants and column (5) presents the green office stock rented by each 
tenant, relative to the total office stock it occupies. Several trends are appar-
ent. First, the California Environmental Protection Agency (Cal/EPA) is not 
only among the top 20 occupants of green office space, but all of its office 
stock has a green label. Indeed, the agency boasts that its headquarters 
building in Sacramento is equipped with state-of-the-art techniques to 
improve indoor air quality and to reduce energy use and that it is among the 
world’s most energy- and resource-efficient buildings. Cal/EPA is a clear 
example of how non-profit or governmental organizations derive non-
financial utility from leasing green, supporting Hypothesis 2. As mentioned 
on the Cal/EPA website, “This approach not only makes environmental 
sense, but it also makes the building a better place to visit and in which to 
work.”
Some of the commercial banks are not only prominent tenants of green 
space in absolute terms but also relative to their total office stock. For exam-
ple, ABN AMRO and Wells Fargo lease substantial proportions of their total 
office needs—58% and 37%, respectively—in green buildings. For the for-
mer, the headquarters in Chicago provides the main explanation. Wells Fargo 
occupies several buildings with a green label. The bank has a well-articulated 
sustainability policy. In interviews conducted by telephone with the authors, 
a representative explained that “. . . it is important to show our environmental 
focus, for example, by leasing green office space.” As argued by Ramus and 
Montiel (2005), it is the implementation of CSR policies rather than the pol-
icy commitment that is necessary to reap direct business benefits.
For other corporations, such as Adobe Systems and Compuware, leasing 
green space may not be a deliberate choice, but it may merely come with a 
preference for high-quality office space, in combination with a growing need 
for space due to rapid expansion. Alternatively, the location of firm activities 
in green buildings may attract and retain highly qualified employees.
Finally, it is worth noting that the 20 tenants documented in Table 2 occu-
pied, on aggregate, almost one sixth of the total inventory of green office 
space in the United States in June 2008.
Eichholtz et al. 15
Although the analysis of the leading corporate consumers of green office 
space provides interesting perspectives on these firms’ motivations, this com-
parison also has a drawback. As it focuses on the largest firms, it under-
reports firms in less concentrated industries. We therefore study the aggregate 
amount of green office space occupied by the largest four-digit SIC codes. 
These numbers are presented in Table 3. Column (1) shows the 20 industry 
categories with the highest aggregate of total green office space. Legal ser-
vices—which include attorneys and their support staffs—are by far the larg-
est occupant of green office space. Although only one individual tenant from 
the legal services industry—Skadden, Arps—is among the 20 major occupi-
ers of green space reported in Table 2, the sector as a whole has a clear prefer-
ence for sustainable office buildings. The preference of the legal services 
industry for more sustainable office space is in line with the economic advan-
tage hypothesis (Hypothesis 1), wherein we posit that tenants in the tertiary 
sector are more likely to lease space in green buildings.
Other industry categories that are among the largest tenants of green space 
are public administration, national commercial banks, crude petroleum and 
gas, and investment advisors. This tenancy pattern is generally in line with 
the stylized facts documented in Table 2.
Column (5) documents green space as a percentage of total office space 
occupied by a sector, and shows that 60% of the space used by the crude 
petroleum and gas industry is green labeled. This fraction is far higher than it 
is for other industries and is consistent with the institutional pressure hypoth-
esis (Hypothesis 3). For example, Chevron has recently occupied a newly 
developed building in Louisiana, which has been awarded a LEED Gold cer-
tification. This award “supports the company’s long-standing commitment to 
the Gulf Coast and the state of Louisiana. The building [ . . . ] provides a safe, 
healthy and productive workplace for up to 750 people.”6 This expression of 
social and environmental awareness is unrelated to Chevron’s core business, 
but may help to improve its reputation among stakeholders.
Tenant Concentration in Green Versus Non-Green Buildings
To investigate the four hypotheses more systematically, the authors calculate 
the fraction of leased office space per building for each tenant in the sampled 
buildings. Then, we aggregate these fractions based on one-digit SIC codes 
for each green building and each control building.7 We consider the following 
one-digit SIC codes: (0) agriculture, forestry, and fishing; (1) mining and 
construction; (2 and 3) manufacturing; (4) transportation, communications, 
electric, gas, and sanitary services; (5) wholesale and retail trade; (6) finance, 
insurance, and real estate; (7 and 8) services; and (9) public administration. 
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For each building, this yields the distribution of office space by major indus-
try category, matched with the characteristics of that building—such as build-
ing age, size, and quality—and the presence of an Energy Star and/or LEED 
certification.
The most direct test of tenant preferences is to investigate the likelihood 
that certain industries systematically lease green rather than conventional 
office space. In Table 4, we therefore compare the fraction of office space 
occupied by a specific industry in a green building with the fraction occupied 
by the same industry in each control building in the same cluster. Using this 
method allows for the inclusion of all industries.8 We estimate the following 
equation for each one-digit SIC code:
                  ( ) ( ) ,O O X X cgn cn n gn cn n
n
N
n n− = + − + +
=
∑α β γ ε
1
 (1)
where the dependent variable is the difference between the fraction of square 
footage occupied by tenants in green building g in cluster n and the fraction 
of square footage occupied by tenants in control building c—where c is 
located in the same cluster. We control for building and location characteris-
tics that are likely to influence corporate housing choices. (Xgn – Xcn) is a 
vector of the hedonic characteristics of the green building—building age, 
building size, and building quality—in cluster n minus the corresponding 
quality characteristics in the control building. The term cn is a dummy 
variable with a value of one if building n is located in cluster n and zero 
otherwise. Importantly, these location coefficients account for unobserved 
characteristics related to each specific location. Terms α, βn, and γn are esti-
mated coefficients and εn is an error term.
Results are presented in Table 4 for ordinary least squares regression mod-
els corrected for heteroskedasticity (White, 1980). Each column header cor-
responds to a specific one-digit SIC industry. Given the relatively high 
adjusted-R2s, the model seems to explain corporate housing decisions quite 
well (the locational clusters alone already explain a large part of the 
variation).
Holding other factors in the regression constant, the intercept indicates 
whether the fraction of office space occupied by tenants in a specific industry 
is larger (or smaller) in green office buildings as compared with conventional 
office buildings. For most industries, the constant is significantly negative, 
which indicates that tenants are more likely to lease space in conventional 
office buildings rather than in environmentally labeled buildings. This find-
ing is consistent with the small fraction of the total environmentally certified 
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office stock. However, as in Ramus and Montiel (2005), the variation in eco-
logical implementation (measured by green building adoption) varies signifi-
cantly across industries, with the coefficient ranging from -1.043 to 0.356.
Importantly, the exceptions to the pattern of significantly negative coef-
ficients are the mining and construction industry—Column (1)—and the 
public administration sector—Column (9). The former has a significantly 
positive constant, which indicates that tenants in this industry group, on 
average, lease more office space in green buildings than in non-green office 
buildings, controlling for differences in building quality. This finding is in 
line with the institutional pressure hypothesis. The fact that the intensity of 
green space use is highest in this industry is surprising, as office utilization 
is expected to be rather limited for the mining and construction industry. 
But, as documented in Table 3, companies in the mining and construction 
industry have a large fraction of their office inventory in green buildings, 
which is confirmed by the results in Table 4. The tendency of “irresponsible” 
organizations to offset an otherwise negative corporate image by responsible 
“social” or “environmental” behavior is widely acknowledged in the litera-
ture (Kotchen & Moon, 2012; Ramus & Montiel, 2005; Strike, Gao, & 
Bansal, 2006).
For the public administration sector, the difference in space occupied in 
green buildings relative to conventional buildings is not statistically signifi-
cant. But, given the fact that we find significantly negative coefficients for six 
other industries, the public sector does stand out as a user of green office 
space. This exception is in line with the environmental responsibility 
hypothesis.
Columns (6) and (7 and 8) report results for the finance, insurance and 
real estate industry, and the services industry, respectively. Especially for 
these industries, which include legal services and commercial banking, one 
would expect that leasing space in green office buildings is rational, as per-
ceptions about indoor air quality and human resource consideration are of 
major importance (Hypothesis 1) and housing costs are a significant part of 
operating expenses (Hypothesis 2). The results show that the coefficient on 
the green variable for both estimations is closer to zero than for most other 
industries, but it remains negative. Although descriptive evidence in Table 2 
indicated that some firms in the finance and services industry are among the 
larger tenants of green space, a more pervasive trend toward leasing green 
cannot yet be documented for these industries, when controlling more 
directly for building and location quality. The difference between the results 
in Table 2 and Table 4 suggests that it is rather the larger and more visible 
firms that move first in the implementation of social and environmental 
measures, followed subsequently by the critical mass in the same industry.
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As a second test, we adapt regression Equation (1), including summary 
measures of variations in the average characteristics of each one-digit indus-
try code by metropolitan area. We include a vector Yn of variables that mea-
sure average employee output, payroll per employee, the number of 
employees per establishment, and the number of establishments. These data 
are computed for each one-digit SIC code by Metropolitan Statistical Area.9 
This leads to the following equation for each one-digit SIC code:
            ( ) ( ) .O O X X c Ygn cn n gn cn n n
n
N
n n n− = + − + + +
=
∑α β γ δ ε
1
 (2)
Table 5 reports the results. Data limitations prevent this analysis for three 
sectors: SIC code 0 (agriculture, forestry, and fishing), SIC code 1 (mining 
and construction), and SIC code 9 (public administration). The variables 
measuring differences in the average characteristics of industries across met-
ropolitan areas—the concentration of establishments and labor productiv-
ity—are generally statistically significant. This finding suggests that there are 
variations in the propensity to “lease green” by industry across metropolitan 
areas—arising from variations in industry characteristics across metropolitan 
areas. This finding is in line with results documented by Cottrill (1990), 
Henriques and Sadorsky (1996), and Ramus and Montiel (2005), showing 
that the degree to which firms implement a CSR policy is, to a large extent, 
determined by industry characteristics.
We measure the clustering of certain industries by including a variable 
reporting the number of establishments for the specific industry in each met-
ropolitan area. The coefficient on this variable is negative for the finance, 
insurance, real estate sector, and for the services industry. This negative coef-
ficient implies that in areas with a higher office space density, the likelihood 
of leasing green office space rather than conventional office space is smaller. 
These locations are likely to be in, or very close to, the Central Business 
District (CBD), which usually has the highest location value. This result con-
firms previous research (Eichholtz, Kok, & Quigley, 2010) which reports that 
the increased rents and market values documented for green buildings are 
smaller at the most desirable locations, lending support to Hypothesis 2.
The variable representing the average size of establishments, measured by 
the number of employees, is significantly positive for four out of five indus-
tries, which suggests a preference for green office space in larger companies. 
For the variable measuring the payroll per employee—a proxy for the quality 
of human capital—the coefficient is almost consistently positive. (And this 
variable varies for each industry group by metropolitan area.) The results 
suggest that tenants who are more dependent on high levels of human capital 
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are more likely to rent office space in green buildings, supporting Hypothesis 
1. Moreover, the significantly positive coefficient on the variable measuring 
sales per employee, a common proxy for labor productivity (see, for exam-
ple, Koch & McGrath, 1996), indicates that in areas with higher employee 
productivity, tenants across all industries are more likely to lease green office 
space. More productive companies employing valuable human capital are 
more likely to rent space in these same buildings. Again, this finding is in line 
with the economic advantage hypothesis. Furthermore, although the intercept 
is significantly negative for the finance, insurance, and real estate industry, as 
well as the services industry, it is substantially closer to zero than the inter-
cepts for other industries reported in Table 5. These differences suggest that 
Table 5. Regression Results: Industry Preference and Green Buildings (Differences 
in Fraction Occupied by SIC in Green Buildings and Non-Green Buildings Within 
the Same Cluster).
(2 & 3) (4) (5) (6) (7 & 8)
Δ Building age −0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.001** 0.000*
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Δ Building quality −0.040** −0.005 −0.113** 0.029* 0.024
[0.015] [0.019] [0.017] [0.012] [0.012]
Δ Building size  
(millions sq. ft.)
0.023 0.007 −0.206** 0.178** −0.122**
[0.030] [0.067] [0.059] [0.030] [0.032]
Employees per 
establishment
0.014** 0.002** −0.003 0.026** 0.001**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.004] [0.001] [0.000]
Log number of 
establishments
0.152** 0.225** 0.135** −0.269** −0.371**
[0.003] [0.004] [0.006] [0.009] [0.005]
Sales per employee 
(thousands of dollars)
0.001** 0.001** 0.001** 0.007** 0.080**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]
Payroll per employee 
(thousands of dollars)
0.000** 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Constant −0.911** −0.946* −1.209** −0.064** −0.261**
[0.035] [0.080] [0.094] [0.021] [0.056]
Sample size 1,231 1,021 1,689 3,307 4,109
R2 .85 .83 .71 .70 .60
Adjusted R2 .77 .73 .59 .61 .50
Note. Columns correspond to one-digit SIC codes: (2 & 3) manufacturing; (4) transportation, 
communications, electric, gas, and sanitary services; (5) retail and wholesale trade; (6) finance, 
insurance, and real estate; and (7 & 8) services. Each regression also includes 1,180 dummy 
variables, one for each distinct cluster. Standard errors are in brackets. SIC = Standard 
Industrial Classification.
Significance at the .05 and .01 level indicated by *, and **, respectively.
22 Business & Society 
firms in the financial sector and in the services industry are more likely to 
rent green space than firms operating in the manufacturing, transportation 
and communication, and trade industries, which lends further support to the 
economic advantage hypothesis.
Discussion
Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research
This article leads to new questions and opportunities for future research. Data 
limitations allow us to investigate the motivations for ecological responsive-
ness, as measured by corporate real estate choices, at the industry level only. 
Ramus and Montiel (2005) show that industry plays an important role in 
firms’ implementation of CSR policies, and the use of green real estate can be 
an important factor in such implementation. However, further research will 
have to use more granular firm-level data, creating a more solid basis for the 
analysis.
Second, firm-level data would also allow for a much richer investigation 
into the relation between firm motivations and ecological strategy. Starik and 
Rands (1995) argue that to analyze the ecological sustainability of an organi-
zation, different levels of analysis are needed. This is only feasible with 
detailed firm-level data.
Third, this research is based on U.S. data only, and it remains to be seen 
whether the conclusions can be extrapolated to other countries. A recent 
global survey of the environmental investment practices of professional real 
estate investors (Bauer, Eichholtz, Kok, & Quigley, 2011) found strong dif-
ferences across countries. These differences may be related to international 
differences in the corporate demand for green space, suggesting that adding 
an international dimension to the study of green corporate real estate deci-
sions could enrich the analysis.
Conclusion
Awareness is growing that the built environment is an important source of 
greenhouse gas emissions and a major consumer of energy and raw materials. 
The number of green commercial properties is rapidly increasing, despite the 
fact that the U.S. commercial property market has been severely affected by 
the economic crisis. On average, firms seem to be willing to pay a rental 
premium for green office buildings, suggesting that this development is at 
least partly demand-driven. Firms conscious of environmental issues seem to 
consider real estate choices in their ecological responsiveness.
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The authors use the information provided by building sustainability 
labels to address the effect of green building on financial intermediaries. 
We empirically test the ecological responsiveness of industries, extending 
Ramus and Montiel’s (2005) analysis of environmental policy implementa-
tion, rather than the mere development of these policies. Our descriptive 
results show that firms in the legal and financial services industries lease 
substantial shares of green office space. This finding is consistent with the 
economic advantage hypothesis, because firms in these office space-inten-
sive sectors are likely to profit most from the operational and productivity 
benefits of green buildings. These findings are reinforced by a regression 
analysis, which shows that the concentration and size of establishments, as 
well as the extent to which human capital is available in a metropolitan 
area, has a distinct influence on the use of environmentally labeled space. 
Again, this finding is in line with the economic motivation for the choice 
for green office space and the notion that labeled office space creates a 
high-quality labor environment.
This study’s findings further show that the mining and construction indus-
try and, more specifically, the oil industry are major users of green office 
space, which follows from the institutional pressure hypothesis. Firms in 
environmentally sensitive industries may actively incorporate sustainability 
in strategic decisions, such as headquarters selection, to offset negative repu-
tation effects. However, for these decisions, economic advantage rationales 
related to employee productivity and attractiveness are likely to be mixed 
with the institutional pressure motivation, which could increase the intensity 
of green space consumption.
The empirical results also show that government and government-related 
organizations, for which non-financial utility may be more important, have a 
relatively strong likelihood to rent green office space. This pattern is likely to 
arise from the environmental responsibility motivation.
Our findings have some implications for financial intermediaries. For 
companies, the findings in this study clearly show that corporate leasing deci-
sions can facilitate the implementation of an ecologically responsible strat-
egy. The results suggest that real estate provides a tangible element of the 
ecological responsiveness of an industry. The magnitude of corporate real 
estate leases and assets is such that the costs associated with leasing and own-
ing these properties have become second only to payroll costs in many orga-
nizations (Veale, 1989). So firms’ decisions regarding green real estate use 
may affect their financial performance.
Our findings on ecological responsiveness and corporate real estate also 
have implications for asset owners and institutional investors. Firms with a 
poor record on sustainability risk the likelihood of being excluded from the 
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portfolios of institutional investors, which may increase their cost of equity 
capital (Hong & Kacperczyk, 2009). Our results show that real estate is an 
aspect of firms’ stance on CSR, and corporate real estate decisions may there-
fore have an impact on firms’ cost of capital. For the providers of space—often 
REITs—the effect of a demand-pull for more green real estate may also have 
implications for their ability to raise capital (Eichholtz, Kok, & Yonder, 2013).
The literature regarding organizations and the natural environment has 
been silent on the decisions by corporations to integrate real estate choices 
into the overall environmental strategy. Yet the importance of corporate real 
estate is such that it has a major effect on the sustainability of the world’s 
economic development and likely also on the financial performance of firms. 
Our results indicate that corporations regard the real estate they consume in 
ways that vary significantly across industries. The corporate choice for green 
real estate is predictable by theory, which suggests that managers make ratio-
nal and informed decisions regarding the sustainability of the space they use. 
So it seems that corporate real estate is fertile ground for further exploration 
of the implementation of corporate environmental policies.
Appendix
Table A1. Variable Definitions.
Variable Description
Size (thousands of square foot) Building size includes the usable area and its associated 
share of the common areas
Stories (number) The number of floors in the building above grade
Low (<10) (1 = yes) Binary variable is 1 if the number of stories is below 10, 
and 0 otherwise
Medium (10-20) (1 = yes) Binary variable is 1 if the number of stories is 10 or 
larger, but smaller than 20, and 0 otherwise
High (>20) (1 = yes) Binary variable is 1 if the number of stories is 20 or 
larger, and 0 otherwise
Building age (number) The number of years since an existing building was 
completed.
Less than 10 years (1 = yes) Binary variable is 1 if the age is younger than 10 years, 
and 0 otherwise
10 to 20 years (1 = yes) Binary variable is 1 if the age is 10 years or older, but 
younger than 20 years, and 0 otherwise
20 to 30 years (1 = yes) Binary variable is 1 if the age is 20 years or older, but 
younger than 30 years, and 0 otherwise
30 to 40 years (1 = yes) Binary variable is 1 if the age is 30 years or older, but 
younger than 40 years, and 0 otherwise
(continued)
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Variable Description
Over 40 years (1 = yes) Binary variable is 1 if the age is 40 years or older, and 0 
otherwise
Building class The office building class designation differentiates 
buildings of the same building type into different 
categories of quality.
A (1 = yes) In general, a class A building is an extremely desirable 
investment-grade property with the highest quality 
construction and workmanship, materials and systems, 
significant architectural features, the highest quality/
expensive finish and trim, abundant amenities, first 
rate maintenance, and in an excellent location with 
exceptional accessibility.
B (1 = yes) In general, a class B building offers more utilitarian 
space without special attractions. It will typically have 
ordinary architectural design and structural features, 
with average interior finish, systems, and floor plans, 
adequate systems, and overall condition.
C (1 = yes) In general, a class C building is a no-frills, older building 
that offers basic space. The property has below-
average maintenance and management, a mixed or low 
tenant prestige, and inferior elevators and mechanical/
electrical systems.
Renovated building (1 = yes) Binary variable is 1 if a building has been completely 
restored so that the existing space becomes “new” 
space again. The date of the last major renovation is 
tracked. Minor renovations, such as the improvement 
of a building’s lobby or exterior, are not considered full 
building renovations.
On-site amenities (1 = yes) Binary variable is 1 if the building has one or more 
special characteristics that can enhance a property’s 
appeal, including the presence of an atrium, banking 
facilities, concierge, convenience store, day care, 
dry cleaner, exercise facilities, restaurant, and retail 
shops.
Asking rent (dollar per square 
foot)
Asking rent is the weighted average rent for a building 
or market. Rents are weighted based on the total 
square footage available at a rental rate. If the rental 
rate is zero, it is not counted in the average rent. 
Average rent is calculated from suite-by-suite detail.
Net rent contract (1 = yes) Binary variable is 1 if the building has a lease structure in 
which the tenant is responsible for all expenses associated 
with their proportional share of occupancy of the building. 
This is the opposite of a gross rental contract, a rental 
rate that includes normal building standard services that 
are provided and paid by the landlord.
(continued)
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Variable Description
Occupancy rate (percent) Occupancy rate is defined as the square footage of space 
that is physically occupied by a tenant as a fraction of 
the total rentable office space. It does not include space 
that is under a lease obligation, where the tenant does 
not actually occupy the space.
Employees per establishment 
(number)
The total number of paid employees, which consists of 
full- and part-time employees, including salaried officers 
and executives of corporations, who were on the 
payroll during the pay period including March 12.
Number of establishments 
(natural logarithm)
An establishment is a single physical location at which 
business is conducted and/or services are provided. It 
is not necessarily identical to a company or enterprise, 
which may consist of one establishment or more. 
When two activities or more are carried on at a single 
location under a single ownership, all activities generally 
are grouped together as a single establishment.
Sales per employee (thousands 
of dollars)
Includes gross receipts from customers or clients for 
services provided, from the use of facilities, and from 
merchandise sold during the census year, whether or not 
payment was received in the year. Calculated as a fraction 
of the total number of paid employees, which consists of 
full- and part-time employees, including salaried officers 
and executives of corporations, who were on the payroll 
during the pay period including March 12.
Payroll per employee (dollars, 
natural logarithm)
Payroll includes all forms of compensation such as 
salaries, wages, commissions, dismissal pay, bonuses, 
vacation allowances, sick-leave pay, and employee 
contributions to qualified pension plans paid during the 
year to all employees. Divided by the total number of 
paid employees, which consists of full- and part-time 
employees, including salaried officers and executives of 
corporations, who were on the payroll during the pay 
period including March 12.
Sources. CoStar Group and Census.gov
Appendix (continued)
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Notes
1. Real estate investments are the most significant alternative asset class for institu-
tional investors: on average, pension funds invest about 5% of assets in real estate 
(average allocations to private equity and hedge funds are 4.00% and 3.23%, 
respectively), and according to an annual survey by Pensions & Investments, 
worldwide real estate assets under management by tax-exempted institutions 
peaked in June 2008 at $1 trillion (Andonov, Eichholtz, & Kok, 2013).
2. Energy Star is the energy-efficiency certification system of the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency and U.S. Department of Energy, and Leadership in Energy 
and Environmental Design (LEED) is the system of the U.S. Green Building 
Council, a non-profit industry group.
3. Evidence on the relative performance of socially responsible investments (SRI) 
is rather inconclusive. Heinkel, Kraus, and Zechner (2001) and Hong and 
Kacperczyk (2009) show that precisely the presence of ethical investors drives 
the prices of irresponsible companies lower, thereby increasing their expected 
total returns. Derwall, Guenster, Bauer, and Koedijk (2005) and Guenster, Bauer, 
Derwall, and Koedijk (2009) show positive risk-adjusted stock market perfor-
mance related to corporate “eco-efficiency.” See Renneboog, Ter Horst, and 
Zhang (2008) for a recent literature review.
4. The six main characteristics of building sustainability according to LEED are the 
following: sustainable sites, water efficiency, energy and atmosphere, materials 
and resources, indoor environmental quality, and innovation. A LEED certificate 
is awarded based on the aggregate score, where the level of the award can range 
from Certified (pass) to Platinum (excellent). There are separate programs for 
existing buildings and newly developed buildings.
5. The totals of green office space occupied by individual tenants or industry 
groups are probably underestimated, as CoStar covers approximately 80% of the 
U.S. commercial property market. Moreover, tenant data are not available for all 
green office buildings.
6. Chevron Press Release, May 2008.
7. We use one-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code aggregates rather 
than two-, three-, or four-digit SIC codes, as these would not yield a reasonable 
number of observations per industry.
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8. In a previous version of the paper, the authors analyzed the propensity to lease 
green space for a specific industry, using a Tobit model. However, the data did 
not have enough observations for SIC code 0 (agriculture, forestry, and fishing) 
and SIC code 1 (mining and construction), and we were forced to exclude these 
industries from the Tobit analysis.
9. The raw data were obtained from the Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business 
Administration (based on data provided by the U.S. Census Bureau for 1997).
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